We study the maximal achievable accuracy of distributed differentially private protocols for a large natural class of boolean functions, in the computational setting.
Introduction
Differential privacy [Dwo06] provides strong input privacy guarantees to individuals participating in a statistical query database. Consider the quintessential example of trying to publish some statistic computed on a database holding confidential data hosted by a trusted server [MPRV09] . For example, consider a query that checks if there is an empirical correlation between smoking and lung cancer instances from the medical records of patients stored at a hospital. The server wants to provide privacy guarantees to each record holder as well as help the client compute the statistic accurately. Even in this setting, where privacy concerns lie at the server's end only, it is clear that privacy and accuracy are antagonistic to each other. The tradeoff between accuracy and privacy is non-trivial and well understood only for some classes of functions (for e.g. [MMP + 10, GMPS13] ). For any level of privacy, we refer to the maximal achievable accuracy in the client-server setting for a particular functionality, as the optimal accuracy.
In the distributed setting, where multiple mutually distrusting servers host parts of the database, privacy concerns are further aggravated. Continuing the previous example, consider the case of two hospitals interested in finding whether a correlation exists between smoking and lung cancer occurrences by considering their combined patient records. In such a setting, we want the servers to engage in a protocol, at the end of which the privacy of each record of both the servers is guaranteed without a significant loss in accuracy. Note that the privacy requirements must be met for both servers, even given their view of the protocol transcript, not just the computed output; thus, possibly, necessitating an additional loss in accuracy.
At a basic level, we wish to study privacy-accuracy tradeoffs that arise in the distributed setting. Following [GMPS13] , in order to obtain results for a wide class of functions, we focus on the computation of functions with Boolean output, with accuracy defined (very simply) as the probability that the answer is correct. The intuition that privacy in the distributed setting is more demanding is, in fact, known to be true in the information theoretic setting: For any fixed level of privacy, it was shown that for all boolean functions that the maximal achievable accuracy in the distributed setting is significantly lower than the optimal accuracy achievable in the client-server setting [GMPS13] , as long as the boolean function depends on both server's inputs. But in the computational setting, this gap vanishes if a (semi-honest 1 ) protocol for oblivious-transfer exists. The two servers would then be able to use secure multi-party computation [GMW87] to simulate the client-server differentially private computation, thereby achieving optimal accuracy on the union of their databases. Although this computational assumption suffices, it is not at all clear whether this assumption is necessary as well.
Indeed, this is a fascinating question because even for very simple functions, like XOR, that require no computational assumptions to securely compute in the semi-honest setting, the question of differentially private computation is non-trivial. Could there be any simple functions that can be computed differentially privately with weaker assumptions? For the general class of boolean output functions, our paper considers the following problem:
"What are the computational assumptions under which there exist distributed differentially private protocols for boolean f with close to optimal accuracy?"
Goyal et al. [GMPS13] showed that for any boolean function such that both parties' inputs influence the outcome, achieving close to optimal accuracy would imply the existence of one-way functions. Could one-way functions also be sufficient to achieve optimal accuracy for certain simple functions?
Our results give evidence that the answer is no. Indeed, we provide evidence that achieving optimal accuracy for any boolean function that depends on both parties' inputs is not possible based on one-way functions. We go further and provide similar evidence that this goal is not possible even based on the existence of key-agreement protocols (which also implies one-way functions; and, thus, is a stronger computational assumption). More precisely, we show a (fully black-box) separation [RTV04] of the computational assumptions necessary to bridge the accuracy gap from the existence of key-agreement protocols. A black-box separation between two cryptographic primitives has been widely acknowledged as strong evidence that they are distinct [IR89] . Indeed, we note that a black-box separation is particularly meaningful in the context of protocols with guarantees only against semi-honest adversaries, like the differentially private protocols we consider in this work. (Recall that an impossibility result like ours is strongest when it applies to the weakest security setting possible -this is why we focus on just semi-honest security.) This is because the most common non-black-box techniques used in cryptography typically apply only to the setting of malicious adversaries: for example, cryptographic proof systems like zero-knowledge proofs are sometimes applied in a non-black-box manner in order for a party to prove that it behaves honestly. However, in the semi-honest security context, such proofs are never needed since even adversarial parties must follow the protocol as specified. We crucially employ recently developed separation techniques for protocols with private inputs from key-agreement protocols [MMP14a, MMP14b] .
Our work is reminiscent of, but also quite different from, the work of Haitner et al. [HOZ13] , who proved that the information theoretic impossibility of accurate distributed differentially private evaluation of the inner-product functionality [MMP + 10] could be extended to a black-box separation result from one-way functions. Our results are different both qualitatively and technically: Qualitatively, our results differ in that they apply to the wide class of all boolean functions where the output of the function is sensitive to both parties' inputs. Furthermore, we show separations from key-agreement protocols as well. Moreover, our separation results for extremely simple binary functions like AND and XOR show that differentially private distributed computation even of very simple functions may also require powerful computational assumptions. At a technical level, a crucial ingredient of our proofs is the recently developed toolset of [MMP14a, MMP14b] 
Our Contribution
Before we elaborate upon our results, we briefly summarize what is known so far about accuracy gaps in the distributed differentially private computation of boolean functions.
Suppose Alice and Bob have inputs x and y, respectively; and they are interested in computing f (x, y) in a differentially private manner in the distributed setting. An ε-differentially private protocol for some functionality f ensures that the probability of Alice's views conditioned on y and y are λ:= exp(ε) multiplicatively-close to each other, where y and y represented as bit-strings differ only in one coordinate (i.e. they are adjacent inputs). Let x and y be the private inputs of parties Alice and Bob respectively. A protocol between them is α-accurate if for any x and y, the output of the protocol agrees with f (x, y), with probability at least α.
For boolean functions, the optimal accuracy (in the client-server model) is α * ε := λ (λ+1) , where λ = exp(ε). 2 Goyal et al. [GMPS13] showed that, in the information theoretic setting, f = AND can only be computed ε-differentially privately up to accuracy α (AND) ε
Similarly, when f = XOR the maximal achievable accuracy is α
< α * ε , for any finite ε > 0. By observing that any boolean function f which is sensitive to both parties' inputs either contains an embedded XOR or AND 3 [CK89], the maximal achievable accuracy is bounded by:
(1)
Note that in the computational setting, if semi-honest secure protocol for oblivious-transfer exists then we can achieve accuracy α = α * ε for any boolean f . We explore the necessary computational assumptions for which this gap in accuracy in the distributed and client-server setting vanishes. Although Goyal et al. [GMPS13] showed that achieving close to optimal accuracy implies one-way functions, we show that it is highly unlikely that such constructions can solely be based on one-way functions. In fact, we show a (fully) black-box separation from an weaker variant of differential privacy, namely computational differential privacy (see Section 2).
Informal Theorem 1.
For any boolean f and privacy threshold ε > 0, there exists a constant c such that any ε-differentially private α-accurate evaluation of f (in the distributed setting) which uses key-agreement protocols in fully black-box manner cannot have accuracy α > (α * ε − c), where α * ε = λ (λ+1) and λ = exp(ε).
Further, our result is tight for f ∈ {AND, XOR} and, in fact, a stronger lower bound is exhibited.
We show that for f ∈ {AND, XOR}: 1) In the information theoretic setting, it is possible to εdifferentially privately α-accurately evaluate f in the distributed setting [GMPS13] , if α α (f ) ε , and 2) In the computational setting, it is impossible to construct (by using key-agreement protocols in black-box manner) an ε-differentially private α-accurate evaluation of f , for α α (f ) ε + 1/poly(κ) (where, κ is the statistical security parameter). In fact, this gives a (fully) black-box separation of a weaker notion of differential privacy, namely computational differential privacy (see Section 2).
Note that it suffices to just consider f ∈ {AND, XOR} because the maximal achievable accuracy for a general boolean function is bounded in terms of α (AND) ε and α (XOR) ε . As a primer, we begin with the separation result from existence of one-way functions.
Separation from One-way Functions. Random oracles serve as an idealization of one-way functions because they cannot be inverted at non-negligible fraction of their image by any algorithm whose query complexity is polynomial in query-length of the random oracle [IR89, GGKT05] .
Suppose there exists a purported ε-differentially private α-accurate protocol for f ∈ {AND, XOR} in the random oracle world, where parties have unbounded computational power and their query complexity is at most n. We show that if δ α (f ) ε +σ then one of the parties could perform additional poly(n/σε) queries to the random oracle and break the ε-differential privacy of the protocol. The existence of this strategy relies on the recent progress of "Eavesdropper strategies in the random oracle setting" for protocols with private inputs [MMP14a] . For more details, refer to Imported Theorem 1.
This impossibility result easily translates into a fully black-box separation result as defined in [RTV04] . This translation of impossibility in the random-oracle model into a black-box separation is using techniques introduced in [IR89, GKM + 00, BM09, DLMM11, HOZ13, MMP14a].
Informal Theorem 2 (Separation from One-way Functions). For f ∈ {AND, XOR}, ε > 0 and α α Separation from Public-key Encryption. To show a similar separation result from key-agreement protocols, it suffices to show a separation from public-key encryption; because public-key encryption is equivalent to two-round key agreement which in turn directly implies (any round) key-agreement protocols. Before we proceed further, we introduce the idealization of public-key encryption as an oracle [GKM + 00].
Our public-key encryption oracle is a triplet of correlated oracles PKE ≡ (Gen, Enc, Dec). The keygeneration oracle Gen is a length tripling random oracle which maps sk ∈ {0, 1} n to pk ∈ {0, 1} 3n , i.e. Gen(sk) → pk. The encryption oracle, is a collection of 2 3n independent length-tripling oracles which maps a message m, using a public-key pk ∈ {0, 1} 3n , to a cipher text c, i.e. Enc(m; pk) → c. The decryption oracle Dec decrypts a cipher text c ∈ {0, 1} 3n using a secret key sk ∈ {0, 1} n . It maps it to (the lexicographically first) m such that Gen(sk) = pk and Enc(m; pk) = c; otherwise outputs ⊥, i.e. Dec(c, sk) → m or ⊥.
This oracle is too powerful and yields a semi-honest secure protocol for oblivious-transfer (see discussion in [GKM + 00]). Thus, it cannot be used to show the intended separation result. An additional Test oracle is provided, which allows testing of whether pk lies in the range of the Gen oracle, and whether c lies in the range of the Enc oracle with public key pk. Intuitively, the Test oracle can be thought of as part of Gen and Enc oracles themselves. Such oracles with image-testability are referred to as image-testable random oracles (ITRO) [MMP14b] .
To tackle the decryption oracle, we follow the technique introduced by [MMP14b] . Suppose there exists a purported ε-differentially private α-accurate protocol for f in the PKE-oracle world. Then there exists an (ε + γ)-differentially private (α − γ)-accurate protocol for f in the "PKE minus decryption oracle" world, i.e. in the (Gen, Enc) oracle world (with implicitly included Test oracles), with query complexity poly(n/γε) and identical round complexity. The slight loss in parameter γ can be made arbitrarily small 1/poly(n).
Finally, similar to the separation from one-way functions, we show that if (α − γ) α (f ) ε+γ + (σ/2) then one of the parties can perform poly(n/σγε) queries and violate the (ε + γ)-differential privacy of this protocol. This part of the result crucially relies on the recently proven result of [MMP14b] which shows that image-testable random oracles mimics several properties of random-oracles and the "eavesdropper strategies" in the random oracle model extend to (collections of) image-testable random oracles as well. Hence, we have the following result.
Informal Theorem 3 (Separation from Key-Agreement). For f ∈ {AND, XOR}, ε > 0 and α α (f ) ε + 1/poly(κ), where κ is the statistical security parameter, there cannot exist an ε-differentially private α-accurate protocol for f in the distributed setting which uses key-agreement protocols in fully black-box manner.
We emphasize that our negative results not only hold for ε-differential privacy, but also hold for a weaker (ε, δ)-indistinguishability based computational differential privacy (see Section 2 for definition). For a precise statement refer to our main theorem, Theorem 1. They demonstrated such gaps for specific large functions such as the inner product and hamming distance, under natural notions of accuracy specific to these functions. Very recently, Goyal et al. [GMPS13] showed the existence of a constant information-theoretic gap between the accuracies of boolean output functions, in the client-server and distributed settings. They also showed that any hope of bridging this gap necessitates the assumption that one-way functions exist.
Related Work
Black-box Separations. Impagliazzo and Luby [IL89] showed that most non-trivial cryptographic primitives imply existence of one-way functions. Subsequently, it turned out that several primitives like pseudorandom generators [ILL89, Hås90] and digital signatures/universal one-way hash functions [NY89, Rom90] can indeed be constructed from one-way functions; thus, establishing equivalence of these primitives to existence of one-way functions. It is highly unlikely, on the other hand, that primitives like key-agreement [IR89] protocols and semi-honest secure oblivious-transfer protocol [GKM + 00] can be securely constructed from one-way functions using black-box construction. A black-box separation result between two cryptographic primitives is widely acknowledged as an evidence that they should be treated as separate computational assumptions.
Reingold et al. [RTV04] formally defined (several variants of) black-box separations. And Gertner et al. [GGKT05] provided a technique to translate information theoretic impossibility results in random oracle model into unconditional black-box separation results.
Recently, there has been significant progress in black-box separation techniques where parties have private inputs due to [MMP14a, MMP14b] . They show that if semi-honest secure function evaluation of any two-party deterministic function exists by using one-way functions or key-agreement protocols in black-box manner then there exists a semi-honest secure protocol for that function in the information-theoretic plain model itself. Haitner et al. [HOZ13] show that the information theoretic impossibility of evaluating the inner-product functionality both differentially privately and accurately [MMP + 10], in the client-server model, can be translated into a black-box separation result from one-way functions.
Technical Outline
Our black-box separation results are a consequence of amalgamation of the following techniques: 1) Information theoretic lower bounds for ε-differentially private α-accurate protocols for f ∈ {AND, XOR} in the distributed setting [GMPS13] , and 2) Recent progress in black-box separation techniques as introduced in [BM09, HOZ13, MMP14a, MMP14b]. Our separation from keyagreement protocols especially relies on the recent results of [MMP14b] . We essentially show that based on computational assumptions like "existence of one-way functions" and "existence of (any round) key-agreement protocol" it is highly unlikely to construct ε-differentially private α-accurate
Henceforth, we shall assume that f ∈ {AND, XOR} and understand the computational assumptions necessary to realize ε-differentially private α-accurate protocols for f , where α > α
Information-theoretic result. Before we begin, we sketch an intuitive summary of the proof technique of Goyal et al. [GMPS13] . They leveraged the Markov-chain property of distribution of next-message function in the information theoretic setting, i.e. the next message sent by a party is solely a (deterministic) function of its current view. Suppose the public transcript generated thus far is m. Then, using this Markov-chain property of protocols in the information theoretic setting and the fact that they begin with independent views, one can obtain the following protocol compatibility constraint: Pr[m|x, y]·Pr[m|x , y ] = Pr[m|x, y ]·Pr[m|x , y], for private inputs x, x ∈ X and y, y ∈ Y. By considering every complete transcript m, the protocol compatibility constraint implies a set of constraints. For every privacy parameter ε 0, they show that there exists an
Separation from one-way functions. Although the result presented in this section is subsumed by our main theorem, we feel that an independent presentation of this result adds clarity to the overall proof.
Suppose we have a (purportedly) ε-differentially private α-accurate protocol for f in the random oracle model, where each party performs at most n private queries to the random oracle. A random oracle randomly maps κ-length bit-strings to κ-length bit-strings, where κ is the statistical security parameter. Assume that α α
To show a black-box separation result from one-way functions, we need to show that if α is significantly larger than α (f ) ε , then the differential privacy constraint must be violated by one of the parties.
But, the Markov-chain property (upon which the information theoretic characterization crucially relies) is not a priori guaranteed in the random oracle model. So, a logical starting point is to consider an algorithm which perform additional queries to the random oracle to kill correlations between parties and ensures this property (with high probability), cf. [IR89, BM09, DLMM11, HOZ13, MMP14a]. For any ρ > 0, there exists a (deterministic) algorithm Eve ρ which performs additional poly(n/ρ) queries to the random oracle based on the public transcript; and appends the sequence of query-answer pairs to the current transcript. This Eve ρ ensures that when she stops, the joint view of Alice and Bob is ρ-close to a product distribution with (1 − ρ) probability. Being agnostic to the private inputs used by the parties, Eve ρ can ensure this Markov-chain property only when, for any complete transcript m, the probabilities Pr[y|m] and Pr[x|m], for every x ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1}, is at least a constant [MMP14a] .
Note that the ε-differential privacy constraint implies that Pr[x|m] and Pr[x |m] are λ = exp(ε) (multiplicative) approximations of each other for adjacent x and x . Consequently, Pr[x|m] is a constant for every x ∈ X ; otherwise the complete transcript m is a witness to violation of εdifferential privacy. Analogously, the same holds for every y ∈ Y.
Therefore, for any ρ > 0, there exists Eve ρ with query complexity poly(n/ρ) such that, with probability (1 − ρ) over the generated public transcript, the joint view of Alice-Bob is ρ-close to a product distribution. Now, consider the augmented protocol where the original ε-differentially private αaccurate protocol is augmented with Eve ρ , who adds her sequence of query-answer pairs to the public transcript. In this augmented protocol, we show that ε-differentially private α-accurate protocol implies α α This technique is applied in a significantly sophisticated manner to show the separation from keyagreement protocols. Thus, we defer our main theorem statement to the following section.
Separation from key-agreement. We show a separation from public-key encryption, which is equivalent to a 2-round key-agreement protocol. Separation from a 2-round key-agreement protocol implies separation from (any round) key-agreement protocols. This separation relies on the recent results pertaining to the "ideal public-key encryption oracle" (PKE-oracle, introduced by [GKM + 00]) as shown in [MMP14b] .
Our result depends on two technical results proven in [MMP14b] . First, they show that, against semi-honest adversaries, queries to the decryption-oracle of PKE-oracle are (nearly) useless; and, finally, the PKE-oracle minus the decryption-oracle (closely) mimics properties of (collection of) random oracles.
The first part shows that if there exists an ε-differentially private α-accurate protocol for f in the PKE-oracle world, then there exists another (closely related) (ε + γ)-differentially private (α − γ)differentially private protocol for f in the "PKE-oracle minus the decryption-oracle" world with query complexity poly(n/γ). Here, the parameter γ can be made arbitrarily small 1/poly(n).
Finally, we use the property that "PKE-oracle minus decryption-oracle" is similar to the random oracle world [MMP14b] . We use the fact that, relative to this oracle, there exists an Eve ρ which can make the joint distribution of Alice-Bob joint views ρ-close to product with high probability. Since
ε+γ,ρ , one of the parties can violate the (ε + γ)-differential privacy of the protocol.
Overall, if δ is at least α (AND) ε + σ, where σ = 1/poly(n), then we can choose γ, ρ = poly(σε) to show that the ε-differential privacy is violated by performing only poly(n/σε) queries to the PKEoracle. In fact, our final theorem rules out a stronger form of differentially private protocols, namely, (ε, δ)-computational differential privacy (see Section 2 for detailed definitions). Intuitively, δ = 0 corresponds to the previously discussed notion of ε-differential privacy. In fact, our final theorem rules out a stronger form of differentially private protocols, namely, (ε, δ)-computational differential privacy (see Section 2 for definitions). Intuitively, δ = 0 corresponds to the previously discussed notion of ε-differential privacy. Our final theorem is:
For any boolean function f whose output is sensitive to both parties' inputs, ε > 0 and λ = e ε , define α (f ) ε as follows:
Then for any α α Note that the negative result rules out fully-BB constructions of ε indistinguishability-based computationally differentially private (ε-IND-CDP) α-accurate protocols with α > α (f ) ε , based on existence of key agreement. The second part of the theorem (the positive result) is with respect to the stronger notion of ε-differential privacy.
An overview of the separation from one-way functions is provided in Section 3. An overview of the proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Section 4. Due to lack of space we defer the full proofs to Appendix B.
Preliminaries
We introduce some important definitions in this section. For more details refer to Appendix A.
Differential Privacy. The following definitions of differential privacy are provided for the distributed setting:
Definition 1 ((ε, δ)-Differential Privacy). A two-party protocol Π is (ε, δ)-differentially private, referred to as (ε, δ)-DP, if for any subset S of Alice-views, for all Alice inputs x and for any pair of adjacent 4 Bob inputs y, y , we have:
The same condition also holds for adjacent Alice inputs x, x and all Bob's inputs y with respect to Bob private views.
Definition 2 ((ε, δ)-(IND)-Computational Differential Privacy). A two-party protocol Π is (ε, δ)computational differentially private, referred to as (ε, δ)-IND-CDP, if for any efficient adversary A, for all Alice inputs x and any pair of adjacent Bob inputs y, y , we have:
The same condition also holds for adjacent Alice inputs x, x and all Bob's inputs y, with respect to Bob private views.
We refer (ε, negl(κ))-IND-CDP as ε-IND-CDP, defined first in [MPRV09] . We note that this indistinguishability based definition is weaker than the simulation based one (SIM-CDP privacy [MPRV09] ). Our separations hold even for this weaker differential privacy definition. In the above definition, the protocol Π, ε and δ are parameterized by the security parameter κ as well, but is not explicitly mentioned for ease of presentation. Without loss of generality, we assume that ε is not an increasing function (of κ); and in all our analysis we shall have δ as a decreasing function.
Accuracy. Following [GMPS13] we measure the accuracy of two-party protocols in evaluating a boolean function as follows:
Definition 3 (α-Accuracy). A two party protocol Π evaluates a function f α-accurately, if, for every private input x and y of Alice and Bob respectively, the output of the protocol is identical to f (x, y) with probability at least α.
Information-theoretic bounds on the maximal achievable accuracy for ε-DP protocols computing the AND and XOR functions, are known in the Plain Model [GMPS13] . Define λ = exp(ε), then α
is the maximal achievable accuracy of any protocol for the AND function, and α (XOR) ε = λ 2 +1 (λ+1) 2 , is the maximal achievable accuracy of any protocol for the XOR function.
Black-box Separations. We use the definition of fully black-box construction as introduced by Reingold et al. [RTV04] . To show a separation of (ε, δ)-IND-CDP α-accurate protocol from keyagreement protocols, we need to show existence of an oracle relative to which key-agreement protocol exists but there exists an adversary which violates the (purported) (ε, δ)-IND-CDP guarantee.
Separation from One-way Functions
Our main result shows a separation from key-agreement protocols. Despite the fact that the separation from one-way functions will be subsumed by our separation from key-agreement protocols, we present this result separately because it is conceptually simpler and captures several of the crucial ideas required to show such black-box separation results.
For ε > 0 differential privacy parameter, suppose α ∈ [α
We shall show that, for such choices of α, we cannot construct ε-IND-CDP α-accurate protocols for boolean f , in the information theoretic random oracle world. It suffices to show this result for f ∈ {AND, XOR}. This is done by showing an impossibility result in the random oracle model against information theoretic adversaries but with polynomially bounded query complexity. However, we shall show existence of an adversary who can break the ε-IND-CDP.
Notations and Definitions
We introduce some notations for our separation result. For security parameter κ, let O κ denote the set of all functions from {0, 1} κ → {0, 1} κ .
We will consider private-input randomized two party protocols Π, such that Alice and Bob have access to a common random oracle O $ ← O κ . As in the plain model, parties send messages to each other in alternate rounds, starting with Alice in the first round. However, they have (private) access to a common random oracle.
For odd i, at the beginning of the i th round, Alice queries the random oracle multiple times based on her current view (private input x, local randomness r A , private query-answer pairs and the transcript m (i−1) so far). She appends the new set of query-answer pairs P A,i to her partial sequence of queryanswers. The complete set of private query-answers at this point is denoted by P 
Similarly, Bob queries the oracle followed by computing and sending his message in even rounds as a function of his view. His view at the end of round i is (analogously) defined to be V 
Two-party protocols in the Random Oracle World
Before we present our separation result, we need to introduce the notion of public-query strategy and augmentation of a protocol with a public-query strategy.
Definition 4 (Public Query strategy). A public query strategy is a deterministic algorithm, which, after every round of the protocol, queries the oracle multiple times based on the transcript generated thus far. It then adds this sequence of query-answers to the transcript being generated.
Definition 5 (Augmented Protocol). Given a protocol Π, the augmented protocol Π + :=(Π, Eve) denotes Π augmented with a public query strategy "Eve" which generates public query-answer sequences after every message in Π and appends them to the protocol transcript after the messages in Π. Now, we define the views of parties (Alice, Bob and Eve) in an augmented protocol Π + :=(Π, Eve). The protocol Π proceeds with parties sending messages in alternate rounds and Eve appending query-answer pairs after the message of the underlying protocol Π is sent.
Formally, consider an odd i. Alice is supposed to generate the message m i in round i. Round i begins with Alice querying the random oracle based on her view (x, r A , m (i−1) , P
is the sequence of query-answer pairs added by Eve thus far. Alice performs additional queries P A,i and sends the next message m i . Thereafter, the public query strategy Eve performs additional queries to the random oracle and adds the corresponding sequence of query-answer pairs P E,i to the transcript. This marks the end of round i. At this point, the views of parties Alice, Bob and Eve are:
(ε, δ)-IND-CDP in the Random Oracle Model
Definition 6 (( , n) Two-party Protocol). An ( , n) two-party protocol is a two-party protocol of round complexity at most n such that both parties have query complexity at most .
Definition 7 ((ε, δ)-IND-CDP ( , n)-Protocol). A two-party protocol Π is (ε, δ)-IND-CDP if for any computationally unbounded adversary (but polynomial-query complexity) A and any pair of adjacent Bob inputs y, y , we have:
The same condition also holds for adjacent Alice inputs x, x with respect to Bob private views.
We emphasize that the adversary A gets access to an oracle O with respect to which the view V A is generated.
Remark: We briefly motivate the reasons behind choosing A as computationally unbounded adversary with polynomially bounded query complexity. Consider a world where "random oracle plus PSPACE" oracle is provided. A computationally bounded adversary in that oracle world shall correspond to an unbounded computational power adversary with polynomially bounded query complexity in the random oracle world. Therefore, we define ε-IND-CDP with respect to such adversaries because we shall exhibit such an adversary to show the separation from one-way functions. Note that we allow the adversary A to perform additional queries to the random oracle, because, in the computational setting, a computationally bounded adversary can perform additional queries to the one-way function itself.
Accuracy is defined identically as in the plain model.
We shall use the following definition on "closeness to product distribution."
Here, X and Y are the respective marginal distributions.
Imported Results
The crux of the information-theoretic bounds derived by [GMPS13] was the leveraging of an important Markov-chain property of the distribution of the next-message function of parties in the information-theoretic setting. More specifically, the next message sent by a party is solely a deterministic function of its current view. Then, using the Markov chain property of protocols in the information theoretic plain model, it is easy to conclude that if the views of both parties were independent before protocol execution, they remain independent conditioned on the public transcript m (n) . For any private inputs x, x ∈ X and y, y ∈ Y, the following protocol compatibility constraint can be obtained directly:
We begin with the observation that this constraint is not guaranteed a-priori in the informationtheoretic random oracle world. Intuitively, the views of both parties may be correlated via the common random oracle and not just the transcript. However, there are algorithms which query the random oracle polynomially many times to obtain independent views [IR89, BM09, DLMM11, HOZ13, MMP14a]. The state of the art (where parties have private inputs) is due to [MMP14a] , from where we import the following theorem.
Imported Theorem 1 (Independence of Views in RO World [MMP14a] ). Given any two-party ( , n) protocol Π (where parties have private inputs), there exists a public query strategy Eve ρ which performs at most poly(n /ρ) queries such that in the augmented protocol
Impossibility in the RO World
Instead of a key agreement enabling oracle, if we just have a random oracle, it suffices to show the following lemma (Refer Appendix B for a complete proof):
and (positive) decreasing δ. If there exists an (ε, δ)-IND-CDP α-accurate protocol for f in the information theoretic random oracle world, then there exists a public query strategy Eve ρ with query complexity poly(n /ρ), where ρ = σ 2 ε/ exp(2ε), such that in the augmented protocol Π + :=(Π, Eve ρ ), (at least) one of the following is true:
1. There exists (ŷ,ŷ ,x) so that: With probabilityδ = poly(σ) over V E ∼ V E we have:
where δ = poly(σ).
2. There exists (x,x ,ŷ) so that: With probabilityδ = poly(σ) over V E ∼ V E we have:
Proof Overview:
Let p V E denote the probability of obtaining public transcript V E over the sample space. Let p V E |x,y denote the probability of obtaining public transcript V E from Π, when the inputs of Alice and Bob are x ∈ X and y ∈ Y.
We first observe that if some input occurs with very low probability, then ε-IND-CDP can be trivially broken (See Appendix C.1 for a formal proof). Therefore, we can directly invoke Imported Theorem 1 such that Eve ρ generates a close-to product distribution on the views of both parties with high probability. This gives a near protocol compatibility constraint on most transcripts.
Next, we observe that if the views of parties are nearly independent, then with high probability, for any inputs x, x ∈ X and y, y ∈ Y the distributions p V E |x,y · p V E |x ,y and p V E |x,y · p V E |x ,y must be close. That is,
For a detailed proof, see Lemma 4 in Appendix C.2. Now, mimicing the proof of Goyal et al. [GMPS13] , we use differential privacy to obtain the following equation for a transcript V E , for all adjacent (x, x , y, y ):
Using the modified protocol compatibility constraint, we can obtain a bound on the minimum number of public transcriptsδ that violate this condition in the augmented protocol Eve ρ for ρ = εσ 2 / exp(2ε) and δ. This bound is significant, that is,δ εσ 2 − δ λ 8 . For a detailed derivation, refer to Appendix C.3. Such significant "bad" transcripts give a contradiction as explained in Appendix B.
Separation from Key-agreement Protocols
For ε > 0 differential privacy parameter, suppose α ∈ [α (f ) ε + 1/poly(κ), α * ε ]. In this section, we shall show that, for such choices of α, there exists an oracle relative to which public-key encryption exists but ε-IND-CDP α-accurate protocols for boolean f do not exist. It suffices to show this result for f ∈ {AND, XOR}. This is done by showing an impossibility result in the key agreement world against information theoretic adversaries but with polynomially bounded query complexity. However, we shall show existence of an adversary who can break the ε-IND-CDP.
Note that public-key encryption is equivalent to 2-round key-agreement protocols and hence this separation translates into a separation of non-trivial (ε, δ)-differentially private protocols for AND or XOR from (any round) key-agreement protocols.
Notations and Definitions
We give some notation and definitions for our separation. These definitions were introduced in [MMP14b].
Oracle Classes
Image-testable Random Oracle Class. This is the set O κ consisting of all possible pairs of correlated oracles O ≡ (R, T ) of the form: Public Key Encryption Oracle Class. We define a class of "PKE-enabling" oracles, from [MMP14b] . With access to this oracle, a semantically secure PKE scheme can be readily constructed, yet we shall show that it does not give (ε, δ)-IND-CDP protocols with any better than informationtheoretic accuracy. This oracle, called PKE κ is a collection of oracles (Gen, Enc, Test 1 , Test 2 , Dec) defined as follows:
• Gen: A length-tripling injective random oracle {0, 1} κ → {0, 1} 3κ that takes as input a secret key sk and returns the corresponding public key pk, i.e., Gen(sk) = pk. A public key pk is valid only if it is in the range of Gen.
• Enc: This is a collection of keyed length-tripling injective random oracles, with keys in {0, 1} 3κ . For each pk ∈ {0, 1} 3κ , the oracle implements a random injective function {0, 1} κ → {0, 1} 3κ . When queried with any (possibly invalid) random public key pk, this oracle provides the corresponding ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1} 3κ .
• Test 1 : This is a function that tests if a public key pk is valid, that is, it returns 1 if and only if pk is in the range of Gen
• Test 2 : This is a function that tests if a public key and ciphertext pair is valid, i.e., it returns 1 if and only if c is in the range of the Enc oracle keyed by pk.
• Dec: This is the decryption oracle, {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} 3κ → {0, 1} κ ∪ {⊥}, which takes as input a secret key, ciphertext pair and returns the unique m, such that Enc(Gen(sk), m) = c. If such an m does not exist, it returns ⊥.
We note that Enc produces ciphertexts for public key pk irrespective of whether there exists sk satisfying Gen (sk) = pk. This is crucial because we want the key set K to be defined independent of the Gen oracle.
We also note that PKE κ without Dec is exactly the same as the image-testable random oracle O
This fact will be used very crucially in the sections that follow, where we compile out the Decryption oracle and work with the resulting image-testable random oracle O (K) k .
Our Setting
We will consider private-input randomized two party protocols Π, such that Alice and Bob have access to a common oracle PKE κ . As in the plain model, parties send messages to each other in alternate rounds, starting with Alice in the first round. However, they have (private) access to a the common PKE κ oracle consisting of (Gen, Enc, Test 1 , Test 2 , Dec).
The views with respect to the PKE κ oracle remain the same as views in the random oracle world. Our underlying sample space in the random oracle world is the joint distribution over Alice-Bob views when r A , r B ∼ U and PKE κ ∼ PKE κ .
We use the definition of (ε, δ)-IND-CDP protocols in the oracle world and accuracy of protocols as introduced in previous section.
Compiling out the Decryption Oracle
Using the query techniques of [MMP14b] , for any arbitrarily small γ, it is possible to construct an (ε + γ, δ + γ) differentially private protocol with accuracy α − γ, that uses only the family of image testable random oracles O (K) k oracle from an (ε, δ) differentially private protocol that uses the PKE k oracle. We import a theorem from their result: Imported Theorem 2 (Decryption Queries are Useless [MMP14b] ). Suppose Π is an ( , n)-protocol in the PKE κ oracle world which is (ε, δ)-differentially private α-accurate protocol for f in the PKE κ world. For every γ > 0, there exists exists a protocol Π which is an (ε + γ, δ + γ), (poly(n /γ), n)differentially private (α − γ)-accurate protocol for f in the (Gen, Enc, Test 1 , Test 2 ) oracle world.
Impossibility in ITRO World
Recall that the PKE-oracle without the decryption oracle is in fact a collection of keyed imagetestable random oracles, where the key-set is K = {0, 1} 3κ ∪ {⊥}. We import the following result of eavesdropper strategy:
Imported Theorem 3 (Independence of Views in ITRO World [MMP14b] ). For any key-set K and any ( , n) protocol Π (where parties have private inputs), there exists a public query strategy Eve ρ which performs at most poly( /ρ) queries such that in the augmented protocol Π + :=(Π, Eve ρ ), the following holds over the views of Eve ρ , when
This gives us exactly the same independence characterization as Section 3.3, and we can obtain the following Lemma for the ITRO world (analogously to the random oracle world).
Lemma 2 (Key Lemma for ITRO-Separation
and (positive) decreasing δ. For any key-set K, if there exists an (ε, δ)-IND-CDP α-accurate protocol for f in the image-testable random oracle world with respect to key-set K, then there exists a public query strategy Eve ρ with query complexity poly(n /ρ), where ρ = σ 2 ε/ exp(2ε), such that in the augmented protocol Π + :=(Π, Eve ρ ), (at least) one of the following is true:
Impossibility in Key Agreement World
To prove Theorem 1, it suffices to show the following Lemma: 
Then, there exists a public query strategy Eve ρ with query complexity poly(n /γρ), where ρ = σ 2 ε/ exp(2ε), such that in the augmented protocol Π + :=(Π , Eve ρ ), δ + γ > γ 5/6 .
Proof Overview:
Note that we can use Imported Theorem 2 to compile any given two-party (ε, δ)-IND-CDP ( , n) protocol Π in the key agreement world with accuracy α > α (AND) ε + σ for the AND function (resp. α > α (XOR) ε + σ for the XOR function), to an (ε + γ, δ + γ)-IND-CDP ( , n) protocol Π with accuracy (α − γ) in the ITRO world (which closely mimics the RO worldAppendix B).
However, while moving from the key agreement to the ITRO world, there is a γ-loss in protocol accuracy and a corresponding (bounded, say γ ) increase in maximal achievable accuracy (Refer Appendix C.4). However, these parameters can be carefully tied to σ such that setting γ + γ = σ 6 helps obtain a contradiction when σ = 1/poly(κ).
Specifically, in the ITRO analysis, the fraction of "bad" transcriptsδ, so crucial to the violation of (ε + γ)-IND-CDP in Appendix B (that is, transcripts which do not satisfy Property A defined in Appendix C.1) for δ = εσ 2 , reduces by 2γ + γ (refer Appendix C.5.) But, since γ + γ = σ 6 , this property is still violated for δ = εσ 2 on more thanδ = σ 3 fraction of the transcripts. Therefore, δ + γ δ δ = σ 5 > γ 5/6 , and thus δ cannot be negl(κ).
In fact, we can show that if σ = 1/poly(κ), it is possible to construct an adversary that breaks (ε + γ)-IND-CDP of the (ε + γ, δ + γ)-IND-CDP ( , n) protocol Π in the ITRO world, with accuracy (α − γ) according to Definition 2. This gives a contradiction and completes the proof.
A Preliminaries
For θ 0, we use a = b ± θ to denote |a − b| θ.
A.1 Two-party Differentially private Protocols
In a private-input randomized two-party protocol Π, Alice has private input x ∈ X and samples local randomness r A ∼ U; and Bob has private input y ∈ Y and samples local randomness r B ∼ U. Alice sends the first message in the protocol; and thereafter they send messages in alternate rounds. That is, messages m 1 , m 3 , . . . are sent by Alice in rounds 1, 3, . . . , respectively, and Bob sends m 2 , m 4 , . . . in rounds 2, 4, . . . , respectively. The partial transcript till round i is m 1 . . . m i and is represented by m (i) . The view of Alice at the end of round i is represented by V B . The protocol Π is a symmetric-output protocol if z A = z B ; and this (common) output denoted by out Π (m (n) ). We shall write the random variable corresponding to it as out Π .
Our underlying sample space is the joint distribution over complete Alice-Bob views when r A , r B ∼ U. The random variable V (i) A , thus, represents the following distribution: Sample a joint view
A , which is the restriction of V A till end of round i. Further, we also write V
(n)
A as V A , if the round complexity of the protocol is implicit.
A.2 Black-box Separations
For completeness, we include the definition of fully black-box reduction between primitives as introduced by Reingold et al. [RTV04] . A primitive is described by a pair P = F P , R P , such that F P is a set of functions g : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * , of which at least one is computable by a PPT machine. R P is a relation over pairs g, M of a function g ∈ F P and a machine M , such that the machine M P-breaks g if g, M ∈ R P . An efficient and secure implementation of the primitive P is a function g ∈ F P which is efficiently computable by a PPT machine, moreover no PPT machine P-breaks g. A primitive exists if it has an efficient and secure implementation.
Definition 9 (Fully Black-box Reduction [RTV04] ). There exists a fully black-box (fully-BB) reduction from a primitive P = F P , R P to Q = F Q , R Q , if there exist PPT oracle machines G (read as, construction) and S (read as, security reduction) such that:
• Correctness: For every implementation g ∈ F Q it holds that G g ∈ F P .
• Security: For every implementation g ∈ F Q and every machine A, if A P-breaks G g then S A g ,g Q-breaks g.
Consider, for example, some fully-BB reduction from primitive P to Q, where P is (ε, δ)-DP for a function f and Q is one-way functions.
• For any implementation g of one-way functions, G g implements an (ε, δ)-DP for f , and
• For any implementation of one-way function and every adversary A such that A g α-breaks the ε-DP experiment, the reduction S A g ,g breaks the one-way function g.
Thus, to show a fully black-box separation of P from Q, it suffices to consider a construction G such that G g ∈ P for every g ∈ Q and exhibit an g * ∈ Q and an adversary A which P-breaks G g * but S A g * ,g * cannot Q-break g * .
Consider the implementation one-way functions using random oracles. Then, in our example, to show a fully-BB separation of two-party (ε, δ)-differentially private α-accurate protocol for f and one-way functions, it suffices to show the following. Consider any construction G which implements two-party (ε, δ)-differentially private α-accurate protocol for f with oracle access to a random oracle and then exhibit an efficient (uniform) adversary A such that A g breaks the (ε, δ)-differential privacy, if α-accuracy holds. Since S is efficient, the query complexity of S A • ,• , i.e. the composition of the reduction S with the adversary A, is polynomial in the length of random oracle queries. And we know that any algorithm with polynomial query complexity cannot invert a random oracle, except at negligible fraction of outputs. So, there exists g * such that the (ε, δ)-differential privacy of the protocol is broken and g * cannot be inverted by the reduction. Thus, showing a fully black-box separation.
B Outline of Black-box Separation
We present a high level overview of the simpler black-box separation from one-way functions. Our oracle is a random oracle which maps κ-bit strings to κ-bit strings. Additionally, a PSPACE oracle is also provided. The PSPACE oracle ensures that all parties have unbounded computational power. It is known that even in presence of a PSPACE oracle, a random oracle cannot be inverted by any algorithm with poly(κ) query complexity at more than a negligible fraction of its image [GGKT05] . Thus, with respect to the "random-oracle + PSPACE" oracle one-way functions exist.
It suffices to consider the information theoretic setting and prove our results in the random oracle model. Henceforth, we shall assume that parties have unbounded computational power but poly(κ) query complexity.
Suppose we are provided with an (ε, δ)-computationally differentially private α-accurate protocol for f = AND. (An analogous argument will also work for f = XOR.) Let α = α (f ) ε + σ, where σ = 1/poly(κ). We execute Eve ρ , where ρ = σ 2 ε/λ 2 , at the end of the protocol. This ensures that with probability (1 − ρ) over Eve view V E , the protocol compatibility constraint is approximately satisfied, namely
Next, of all of Eve's views, we consider the set of Eve views V E where the following is satisfied: There exists a tuple (x, x , y) or (y, y , x) such that,
or the analogous statement for (y, y , x) holds. Let Z denote this set of Eve's views.
We have, from Corollary 2 and Corollary 3, that with probability at leastδ = εσ 2 − δ λ 8 , a public transcript V E ∼ V E lies in Z. On any such V E , there is a witness tuple (x, x , y) or (y, y , x) for which the condition mentioned above holds at V E . Overall, of the 8 possible witnesses, we choose the most probable one. We call is the representative witness. Suppose (ŷ,ŷ ,x) has the highest overall probability, i.e. it is a witness with probability at leastδ/8.
Now consider A which outputs 1 only at those transcripts V E such that
And A outputs 0 everywhere else.
We note that since (ŷ,ŷ ,x) is a witness with probability at leastδ/8, over transcripts V E ∈ Z, Pr[A(V E , x)|y] outputs 1 (with the input of Bob being y) is greater than exp(ε) · Pr[A(V E , x)|y ] by δ δ /8.
With respect to this tuple, the protocol is not (ε,δ)-computationally differentially private, wherê δ = δ δ /8 7σ 4 ε 2 64λ and δ = σ 2 ε λ . Therefore, the original protocol cannot have δ >δ. In other words, if α α General Functionalities f . Let f be a function where both parties' inputs influence the output. Let (x 0 , x 1 ) and (y 0 , y 1 ) be input pairs such that they represent an XOR minor in f . If f does not contain any XOR minor, then choose (x 0 , x 1 ) and (y 0 , y 1 ) to correspond to an AND minor in f . Note that, because both parties' inputs influence the output of f , it necessarily contains at least one AND or XOR minor [CK89] .
For this minor, compute the representative witness as defined in the previous section. Suppose the tuple for which privacy breaks is (ŷ,ŷ ,x). Now, in the computational differential privacy experiment corresponding to this tuple, note that we do not have access to the input {x 0 , x 1 } \ {x}. So, in the computational differential privacy experiment, our adversary A does the following: Let η denote the size of Alice's input space X , and x i representx with its i-th bit flipped, for i ∈ [η]. Then for everyx ∈ {x 1 , . . . ,x η }, the adversary A runs Eve ρ with respect to the input pairs (x,x) and (ŷ,ŷ ); and outputs 1 if and only if the following condition is satisfied for (at least) one value ofx:
So, we can claim that if the original protocol is (ε, δ)-differentially private and α-accurate, then δ > 7σ 4 ε 2 8λ . This contradicts the ε-computational differential privacy of the original protocol.
Separation from Key-agreement. The separation from Key-agreement protocols follows a similar outline. Suppose we are provided with an (ε, δ)-
and σ = 1/poly(κ). We apply a result of [MMP14b] to obtain the following result. We construct a (related) protocol Π in the O
-accurate (poly(n /γ), n)-protocol for f , where γ = σ 6 . Now, we apply a result of [MMP14b] which says that collection of image-testable random oracles mimics several properties on random oracle. In particular, there exists a dependence killing public query algorithm. Finally, we show that (similar to the previous separation from one-way functions) that there exists a constant c ∈ (0, 1) such that: δ + γ γ 1−c . The adversary performs poly(n /σγ) additional queries to the oracle. This implies that δ cannot be negl(κ).
C Technical Results
For brevity, we define some additional notation that will help prove our impossibility result.
Let p V E |x,y denote the probability of obtaining transcript V E from protocol Π, when the inputs of Alice and Bob are x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. Let p out|x,y denote the probability of obtaining boolean output out ∈ {0, 1} when the inputs of Alice and Bob are x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. Let p x,y|V E denote the probability of Alice and Bob having private inputs x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, conditioned on transcript V E . Let p denote the probability p x,y|V E , then we have for any p X,Y |V E where X, Y ∈ {x, x } × {y, y }: 1 (λ + 1) 2 + (δ /4p) · (λ + 3) p X,Y |V E λ 2 + (δ /4p) · (λ + 1) (λ + 1) 2 + (δ /4p) · (λ + 3)
C.1 Property A
The claim follows by substituting 0 (δ /4) p x,y|V E 5 .
C.2 Near Protocol Compatibility
The following lemma shows that if the views of parties are nearly independent, then with high probability, for any inputs x, x ∈ X and y, y ∈ Y the distributions p V E |x,y · p V E |x ,y and p V E |x,y · p V E |x ,y are close.
Definition 10 ((1 − β) -Protocol Compatibility). A public transcript V E generated by protocol Π is said to be (1 − β) protocol compatible, if the following constraint holds for all (x, x ) ∈ X and (y, y ) ∈ Y: p V E |x,y · p V E |x ,y = p V E |x,y · p V E |x ,y ± βp 2 V E Let S z denote the set of all transcripts V E , such that out V E = z and equation (6) holds.
Then, Pr[V E ∈ S z ] (1 − 8(ρ +δ)). Then,
Let T z be the set of all transcripts V E , such that out V E = z and equation (6) does not hold. Then, for all V E ∈ T z ,
Summing up over all transcripts V E such that out V E = z, we obtain p z|x,y + λ −1 · p z|x ,y p z|x,y + λ · p z|x ,y + 256ρλ 2 + 64δ + 6δ λ
All other inequalities can be proven similarly. Using Lemma 5, we also obtain the following constraints on p 0|x,y for adjacent x, x ∈ X and y, y ∈ Y.
p 0|0,1 + p 0|1,0 λ −1 · p 0|0,0 + λ · p 0|1,1 +ρ p 1|0,1 + p 1|1,0 λ · p 1|0,0 + λ −1 · p 1|1,1 +ρ Substituting p 0|0,1 + p 0|1,0 = q, we obtain the following three linear inequalities: q λ −1 · p 0|0,0 + λ · p 0|1,1 +ρ (7)
q 2α
(AND) ε,ρ,δ ,δ (8) q 2 − (λ + λ −1 ) + λ · p 0|0,0 + λ −1 · p 0|1,1 −ρ (9)
We observe that the two lines bounding the half-planes specified by (8) and (9), with (q, p 0|0,0 ) being the free variables and (λ, α (AND) ε,ρ,δ ,δ , p 0|1,1 ) the parameters, intersect at (p * 0|0,0 , q * ) such that p * 0|0,0 = 1 + λ −2 − 2λ −1 + λ −1 (2α (AND) ε,ρ,δ ,δ +ρ) − λ −2 p 0|1,1 and q * = 2α (AND) ε,ρ,δ ,δ Claim 2. (p * 0|0,0 , q * ) satisfies (7), i.e. 2α
(AND) ε,ρ,δ ,δ λ −1 · p * 0|0,0 + λ · p 0|1,1 +ρ
Proof. Assume to the contrary, that 2α (AND) ε,ρ,δ ,δ > λ −1 · p * 0|0,0 + λ · p 0|1,1 +ρ (10)
Consider two cases:
• p 0|0,0 p * 0|0,0 . Then q (7)
λ −1 · p 0|0,0 + λ · p 0|1,1 +ρ λ −1 · p * 0|0,0 + λ · p 0|1,1 +ρ which is a contradiction since λ 1 and p 0|0,0 > p * 0|0,0 .
